Human Spaceflight and American Society: The Record So Far by Murray, Charles
Human Spaceflight and American Society:
The Record So Far—Charles Murray
25
Keynote Address
22785-looking back book final 2  11/20/02  1:13 PM  Page 25
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060021508 2019-08-29T21:58:07+00:00Z
22785-looking back book final 2  11/20/02  1:13 PM  Page 26
27
These remarks give me an excuse to revisit a world that
Catherine Cox and I had a chance to live in vicariously from
1986 to 1989 when we were researching and writing about
Project Apollo. As I thought about it, I realized that actually very
few people in this audience have had a chance to live in that
world, either vicariously or for real. For most people today,
NASA’s human spaceflight program is the Shuttle. The NASA
you know is an extremely large bureaucracy. The Apollo you
know is a historical event. 
So to kick off today’s presentations, I want to be the “Voice
of Christmas Past.” If we want to think about what is possible
for human spaceflight as part of America’s future, it is essential
to understand how NASA people understood “possible” during
the Apollo era.
It is also important to understand that the way NASA func-
tioned during the Apollo Program was wildly different from the
way NASA functions now. In fact—and I say this with all due
respect to the current NASA team members who are doing fine
work—the race to the Moon was not really a race against the
Russians; it was a race to see if we could get to the Moon before
NASA became a bureaucracy, and we won. But the lessons of that
experience should be ones that we still have at the front of our minds.
First, I would like to provide some perspective on time scale.
Think back to 20 July 1990. This was the twenty-first anniversary
of the first lunar landing, but that is not why I chose the date.
From 20 July 1990 to May 2001 is the same amount of time as from
the founding of NASA to the first Moon landing, only eleven years.
If you think back to what you were doing on 20 July 1990, it just
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was not that long ago. So if we think about what infrastructure
for human exploration of space existed in 1958, when NASA
started, we realize there was virtually none. At that time, there were
few buildings, a small staff, and not a glimmer of the equipment
that Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo would use. At that time, the
largest booster in the U.S. launcher inventory was the Redstone,
which was less powerful than the escape tower on the Saturn V. The
Space Task Group that was responsible for NASA’s early human
spaceflight efforts was formed only a few months after NASA itself.
Occasionally I am asked, “How can we get to Mars?” I am
tempted to say, “Well, junk the current space program, go down
to Langley Air Force Base, put together forty-five people that
have no experience whatsoever, give them eleven years, and they
will do it.” Now that is facetious, but it is how short the period
of time was between ground zero and the first Moon landing.
The speed is only symptomatic, however, of the way that
NASA functioned during those early years, and I want to go over
a few of those characteristics. The first was simply youth. Of the
forty-five people who were initial members of the Space Task
Group, Robert Gilruth was the oldest at forty-four. Joe Shea and
George Low got their jobs at thirty-two and thirty-four, respec-
tively. Chris Kraft got his first big job at the age of thirty-four.
Glynn Lunney and Gene Kranz, lead flight directors during the
big Apollo missions, became flight directors in their twenties,
and they were still barely into their thirties when they were lead
flight directors for the Apollo flights.
People were very young, and it made a difference. As you
talk to the people of Apollo, they will say over and over, “We didn’t
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know we couldn’t do it.” People who were older who would try
to come into this business often were not able to cut it. The reason
they could not cut it was that they were too aware of all the ways
that things could go wrong.
One of the things that youth brings with it is an ability to
form tightly knit teams, another characteristic of the early NASA.
It was so small to begin with that everybody knew one another.
Even though by the time Apollo flew, it had mushroomed into
tens of thousands of people, those initial connections remained.
There were people who had known each other at Langley Center
and at Lewis Center who dealt with each other in ways that had
nothing to do with their places in the organization charts.
Joe Bobek, who was a second-generation Polish immigrant
with only a high school education but a genius mechanic,
became chief inspector for the Apollo spacecraft. In contrast,
George Low was the courtly offspring of an affluent Austrian
family, a brilliant engineer, and exceedingly well educated.
Before every Apollo flight, George Low would take a sandwich
down to the pad and sit down with his old mechanic buddy from
Lewis Research Center. They would talk about what George
Low needed to know about that spacecraft.
You had people such as Joe Shea and George Low taking
demotions all the time during the Apollo Program. They were
sent out of Washington to the Centers. They were technically far
lower on the ladder than they had been before, but the reason
they did that was because that was where the action was.
I do not want you to feel that I am completely unrealistic
and starry-eyed about Apollo. Were there any people who were
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mostly concerned about their careers during Apollo? Of course
there were. But if you talked to a lot of people from Apollo, you
also got a very clear message with lots of evidence that this was
the period of their life when their personal careers really weren’t
nearly as important as focusing on the job at hand.
People were calling back and forth, ignoring lines of hierarchy
in their quest to solve problems. Incredibly brilliant engineers
were running the program. People such as George Mueller, who
was in charge of human spaceflight at Headquarters, were
extremely well-versed in virtually all details of their programs. In
terms of engineering, Mueller could wrestle to the ground a rela-
tively low-level engineer on his own particular specialty. The
same thing could be said again and again for people such as
Shea, Low, Max Faget, and all the rest. They were managers,
yes, but they knew just about everything there was to know
about the systems they were dealing with, and this made a lot of
difference when they wanted to obtain the respect and the over-
time work and the commitment of the troops.
Another important aspect of the program, which you can
get away with more easily when it’s a young program, was its
incredible audacity. I shall give you three examples. 
The first example goes back to George Mueller in 1963.
He came into NASA as head of human spaceflight and set his
underlings to work on a comprehensive look at the schedule and
how it was going. They were not going to get to the Moon
before 1970 or 1971; that was absolutely clear. So what did
George Mueller do? He imposed on the Centers all-up testing.
This meant that the first flight of the Saturn rocket, with its
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mammoth 7.5 million pounds of thrust in the first stage alone, would
be with all three stages in that stack. All three stages were untested
when Mueller made this decision. This approach was anathema
to the German rocket team down at Marshall. The Germans had
done very well by testing incrementally, one piece at a time.
The engineers from Langley had done very well taking
their experimental aircraft over the years and testing them out
one step at a time. Here was this guy from the ICBM world, the
third culture, as it were, that made up NASA in those days,
telling them, “We’re going to do all-up testing—we’re going to
do it all at one time.” No committees made that decision. George
Mueller made that decision. It was not a political decision. He
was not doing it just to get to the Moon before 1970, although
that was clearly one of the motivations for it. But the engineering
logic behind it was absolutely fascinating. I recommend you look
at this decision-making process as a case study of rigorous engi-
neering thinking combined with enormous willingness to do
what was necessary to get a job done.
The second case of audacity was George Low’s decision to
make Apollo 8 a circumlunar mission. Again, in reconstructing how
it was done and why it was done, we are not talking about some
wild-eyed adventure. There were engineering reasons why it was
possible and why it was not only possible, but valuable. But it
was the kind of decision which pushed everything in the schedule
a quantum leap ahead of where it would have been otherwise.
The third case of audacity is not a particular event; it is the
years that Joe Shea was the head of the Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office. It has been Joe Shea’s legacy to be remembered
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as the guy who was pushing so hard that mistakes were not
caught, and we had the 1967 fire that killed three astronauts.
This was a very controversial period in NASA history, and Joe
Shea certainly took the fall for the accident. Nobody was
tougher on Joe Shea than Joe Shea was on himself. 
I submit to you that he was doing exactly the same thing
that George Mueller and George Low were doing. But the coin
came up tails for him. But if it had come up tails for George Low
in Apollo 8, people would have said, “What on Earth are you
doing trying to send the second manned flight of an Apollo
spacecraft around the Moon?” If the first flight of the Saturn V
on the all-up had failed, people would have said, “Well, that was
really dumb to try to test all three stages at once.” The first time
it had ever been done, everybody told him he should not do it,
and look what happened.
The Apollo Program was audacious, and occasionally it failed.
But the only reason we had a spacecraft as mature as the one we
had in 1967 was because Joe Shea had been operating that way
for four years and accomplishing wonderful things by so doing.
In trying to pull together my thoughts about the way
NASA operated, I would like to suggest considering the Apollo
12 mission. I recommend that NASA have a three-day seminar
for senior management staff on Apollo 12, meditating on it as a
fascinating example of managing a space program. As some may
recall, Apollo 12 was hit by lightning. It was actually hit by
lightning twice in the boost phase of the first stage, knocking
everything onboard to flinders. All the warning lights went on.
Down on the ground, it wasn’t that all the data had been lost on
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the controllers’ screens,
but that the data made no
sense whatsoever. They
didn’t know that the
spacecraft had been hit
by lightning. All the con-
trollers knew was that
the platform had been
lost; the guidance plat-
form had been lost; that
they weren’t able to read
any of their data; and it
was taken for granted
that what you had to do
at that point was abort.
Here is the first vignette from that Apollo 12 launch.
Sitting at one of the mission control consoles was one John
Aaron. He later rose to great heights in NASA, but at that time
he was only twenty-five or twenty-six years old. A year earlier,
he had been sitting in the control room at Houston watching a
test at the Cape, which they often did just to get to understand
their systems better. 
This particular time, at some point during the test, his screen
suddenly turned to weird numbers. Incidentally, the screens of the
Apollo controllers did not have nice graphics on them. They were
black screens. They had fuzzy white numbers, [with] columns of
fuzzy white numbers on them at that time. That’s all the controllers
viewed. The numbers were constantly changing. Incidentally, it is
Shortly after liftoff on 14 November 1969,
lightning struck the Apollo 12 Saturn V launch
vehicle and the launch tower. NASA Image
KSC-69PC-812. Special thanks to Kipp
Teague for help with this image.
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also true that the numbers were not in real time because the
computers were quite slow. So controllers had to factor in that
some of the numbers that were changing were 15 seconds old,
while other numbers were 10 sec-
onds old and so forth. That is the
kind of thing you did if you were an
Apollo controller.
Aaron had looked into things,
called up the Cape, and finally man-
aged to figure out what was going
on. He was told of an obscure
board, called the signal condition-
ing equipment, SCE, that would
have restored their numbers if it was
switched to auxiliary mode. This
was something that John Aaron had
done that was not a formal part of his job. It was part of hundreds
of similar experiences he’d had. This was not something that the con-
trollers had practiced in any simulation since then. He was probably
one of the only people in all of NASA who knew this thing existed.
In the critical launch phase, when they were about to lose a crew,
when everything was going crazy, Aaron looked at that screen, and
he understood within a matter of seconds what was going on. 
On the Apollo 12, the spacecraft had been hit by lightning
twice in the initial ascent phase. Controllers had lost the platform
but managed to reset it. They had a couple of hours in which to go
through tests of the spacecraft, and then they had to decide
whether to go forward with translunar injection.
Technicians in the Firing Room




Special thanks to Kipp Teague for
help with this image.
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Catherine Cox and I really wanted to reconstruct the decision
that was being made by Rocco Petrone, Chris Kraft, Jim McDivett,
and the other senior people who were in charge of that flight. We
talked to all of them, and we couldn’t get a story out of it
because here’s what happened. These twenty-six-, twenty-seven-,
twenty-eight-, twenty-nine-year-old controllers went through all
the systems down there in the control room. Then they turned
around to the back row and said, “We’ve got a clean spacecraft;
let’s go,” and there was no fretting about it. 
When I was interviewing Gene Kranz once, I asked him,
“Gee, this seems to me like a very dicey thing to do. Yes, you’ve
checked out the spacecraft, but, after all, the thing has been hit
by a huge bolt of lightning through all its electronics.” Kranz
was very matter-of-fact about it—“No, you go the way the data
leads you.” So I finally asked him “if a similar thing happened
with the Space Shuttle and you had to make the equivalent of a
decision to go out of Earth orbit, would you do the same thing?”
Gene Kranz was not often at a loss for an answer, but he just sat
and stared at me for about five seconds, and then he broke into
a laugh, and he didn’t say anything.
That was the way that that mission worked. It was a story
of everything that made the human spaceflight program such a
wonderful adventure, as well as an excellent case study from
which later people could learn.
I second the remarks of Administrator Goldin about the
future of human spaceflight. I think that his aspirations for it are
just right. The only thing I would add is that if it is to succeed,
human spaceflight must most of all capture the public imagination.
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Part of the reason for that is hardheaded politics; you can’t have a
big program unless you have gotten the political funding for it,
and the political funding only comes for it if you have captured
a large part of the public imagination.
The essence of human spaceflight is that it does great
things. That is how it captures the public imagination. About
600 years ago, with the invention of the scientific method, the
deep abiding human impulse to understand and to explore,
which previously had been confined to philosophy and religion,
was let loose on all the other ways that we could explore the
world. Now, in the twentieth century, I think that human space-
flight touches the wellspring of the human spirit and excites a
great many people. Human spaceflight also represents the great
next adventure in that continuing quest to understand and to
explore—only this time it is to understand and explore the universe.
We are never going to get a majority of the American people
to share in that aspiration any more than you could get 51 percent
of the people in Europe who wanted to get in small dangerous
boats and go to the new world. There always will be objections
such as “We would be better off spending money to combat
poverty here on Earth.” There is, however, a sizable minority
who has a lot of influence, and they can be energized. But the
only way that they can be energized is if human spaceflight
remains true to its mission—it must do something beyond building
one brick after another. It must continue to push the envelope
with audacity, by going [to] new places, by doing new things, by
taking on grand missions.
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So as somebody who doesn’t have a technical background
and doesn’t work for NASA, I’ll go ahead and give some advice
anyway. Get a grand mission, believe in it, give it to a new gener-
ation, and get the hell out of the way. Thank you very much.
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